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.th
a.  =  j  act or prospect
B  =hypothetical distribution
.th  th
c..  =  consequence associated with i  state and  j  act
D  =  hypothetical distribution
E  =  expected value
F  =  theoretical distribution used generally
G  =  theoretical distribution used generally
H  =  G-F  (i.e.,  difference between  theoretical distributions)
I  =  total number of  relevant  states, i =  1, ... ,  I
J  =  total number of  relevant  acts, j  =  1,  ... ,  J
m  =  monetary outcome
n  =  denotes order of  cumulative distribution function or  of  the  derivative
of  the  utility function
p  =  probability
Q  =  hypothetical distribution
r  =  Pratt absolute  risk aversion coefficient
.th s.  i  state
U  =  utility function
u  =  refers  to one  of  the variables in integration by  parts
v  =  refers  to other variable in integration by  parts
W  =  hypothetical distribution
Z  =  hypothetical distribution
M  =  random variable  for monetary outcome
iiI.  INTRODUCTION
Agricultural production is  characterized as  being inherently  stoch-
astic.  The effects  of  output  levels  from such phenomena as weather, insects,
and disease  combined with unknown prices  for  inputs and outputs  give rise  to
considerable  risk.-  To successfully direct  the farm in this environment,
the farm manager must predict  the stochastic  components  and select  those
strategies which provide  the  greatest probability of  maximizing the farm
goals.
Decision making, by definition, involves  a choice among  alternative
courses  of action  that offer different consequences  or outcomes.  To make a
choice, decision makers must  apply some criterion or valuation principle
to  the  consequences  to identify  that alternative with the most desirable out-
come.  When decision makers  are  uncertain about  the  consequences  of  a decision,
they are said  to  face  a risky choice.
The topic  of  decision making under risk has occupied a major portion
of  the economics  literature over  the past  40 years.  Many of  the articles
have provided new and interesting theoretical arguments  that attempt to
rationalize human behavior in  terms  of decisions  they make.  One approach that
has  received much attention in recent years  is  called stochastic dominance.
This  approach consists of  a set  of  rules  for ordering  risky alternatives when
little  is  known about  the  decision maker's preferences.  As  such,  it may be
particularly applicable to decision problems found  in agricultural research,
extension, and policy.
The purpose of  this  paper  is  to  contrast the  ordinary and  generalized
stochastic dominance approaches and  discuss  some empirical applications.
- Risk is  defined here  to be  the  difference between the  consequence or
outcome an  individual expects and what actually happens.-2-
The following  section provides  a brief discussion of  the major theoretical
terms  and concepts  relating to  risky decisions.  An understanding  of  these
basic concepts  is  important  for  the discussion  that follows.  The  third
section  focuses  on a description of  the  rules and assumptions  that  comprise
the  ordinary stochastic dominance approach.  Some examples  of  empirical
applications  are  then presented.  The section concludes with a brief discussion
of  the  limitations of  the ordinary stochastic dominance  approach.  The
fourth section provides  a description of  the generalized stochastic domin-
ance approach  (i.e.,  stochastic dominance with respect  to a function or
Meyer's  criterion).  The  theory and rules  that  comprise this  approach and a
discussion of  the  empirical applications  are  also presented.  The final
section provides  a brief summary  and some concluding  comments.  The presen-
tation  emphasizes the use  of  simple numerical examples  to provide  an intui-
tive understanding of stochastic  dominance.  Proofs of  the underlying theorems
are included in  the Appendix for the  interested reader.
II.  THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Agricultural decision analysis  can be classified as  either normative
or  positive.  Normative decision analysis  is  concerned with determining  how
farm managers  ought to  behave, in terms  of  the  decisions made, so  as  to  be
consistent with their preferences  and objectives.  Positive decision analysis
is  concerned with describing or  explaining particular decisions  taken by an
individual farm manager. The general background in this section relates  to  norma-
tive applications,  although  the  concepts may be  of  interest for positive
applications as well.
A decision problem  (under risk)  is characterized by several  compon-
ents.  These include:  (i) acts or  risky prospects  (a.eA,  j=l,...,J) - the
alternative courses of  action available to  the decision maker between which
a choice must be made  (e.g.,  types  of crops  that may be  grown);-3-
(ii)  states of nature  (s.iS,  i-l,...,I) - referring  to  the  possible states
(or levels)  of  the variables beyond the  control of  the  decision maker  (e.g.,
weather);  (iii)  probabilities  (p(si), i=l,...,I) - indicating the
(subjective) degree of  belief  held by  the decision maker about  the  frequency
of  occurrence of  the states of  nature;  (iv)  consequences  (cij)  j=l,...,J;
i=l,...,I) - stating  the  outcomes or  payoffs  that result when act j
is chosen and  state  of nature i occurs;  and  (v) the choice criterion -
the  objective function or valuation principle held by  the decision
2/
maker that  is  used in  the selection of  the "best" alternative.-
The choice  criterion is  necessarily  closely tied  to  the  unit of
measurement of  the  consequences.  Decision theorists have found  it  useful to
quantify  the preferences  for  the  consequences  in terms  of  a general unidimen-
sional measure referred  to as utility  (U).  The  utility value  of  a consequence
U(cij.)  is nothing more  than a real number  (or index) that represents  the
relative desirability of  that  consequence  (Lindley, 1971).
A utility function  is a mathematical device  used by decision theorists
to assign real numerical utility values  to  the  consequences  in a way
that is  consistent with the decision maker's preferences.  The decision
maker's preferences must satisfy  several  conditions before a utility
function  is  said  to exist.  These are  expressed in the  following
3/ axioms:-
(i)  Ordering and transitivity  - for all pairs of  risky prospects,
say, al,a2eA the  decision maker either  prefers a  to  a2, a2 to a1, or is
2/ 2/  A term that is often used  to  refer  to  the procedure of  identifying the
"best"  alternative or set of  alternatives  is  "efficiency  analysis".  A
choice or  efficiency criterion is  a way  of reducing  the  size  of  the  choice
set by eliminating  (or  ordering) the  elements  that are dominated by other
elements in  the  set.
3/ - The choice of  the subscripts on  the acts  is arbitrary.-4-
indifferent between them.  Only one  of  these possible orderings  is  true for
any pair of  risky prospects.  The logical extension of  ordering is  the  tran-
sitivity or orderings of more than  two risky prospects.  This implies  that
for any  al,  a2, a3eA if  the decision maker prefers  al to a2 (or is  indifferent
between them) and prefers  a2  to a3  (or  is  indifferent between  them),  then
a  will be preferred to a3 (or there will be indifference between them).
(ii)  Continuity-  if  al is preferred  to  a2 and a2  is preferred to
a3 by  the decision maker,  then a (subjective) probability, p(al),  exists
other  than zero or  one, such that  there is indifference  between a2  for certain,
and a lottery involving al with probability p(a1)  and  a3 with probability
1-p(a ) .-
(iii)  Independence - if  a1 is preferred  to a, by  the decision maker
and a3 is  another risky prospect,  then  the decision maker will prefer a
lottery involving a  and  a3 as  its outcomes  to  a lottery involving  a2 and
a3 when p(a)  =  p(a2) .
A decision maker whose preferences  are  consistent with these axioms
is  said  to possess a well-defined utility function for risky prospects.
The utility function has the  following properties:
(i)  If  al  is preferred  to a2,  then U(al)>U(a2), and vice versa.
(ii) The  utility of  a risky prospect  is equivalent  to the  expected
utility of  its  consequences.  This is known as  the expected  utility theorem.
(iii)  The utility value for the  risky prospect is  assigned an arbi-
trary origin and unit of  scale.  This implies  that the  properties of a
utility function relevant  to a choice are not  changed with positive, linear
transformations.  It  also implies  that  comparisons  of  utility values between
individuals have  little meaning.
4 /  A lottery involves  a gamble  that offers various consequences with specified
probabilities.The utility  function provides  the logical means  for ordering  the risky
prospects  in a manner  that  is  consistent with the  degree  of belief  that each
state  of  nature will occur and  the preferences  of  the  individual decision
maker.  It  follows from this concept  and  its properties  that  decision makers
should act  so  as  to  maximize expected utility  (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1967).
In many decision problems, particularly  those  in  agriculture,  the
consequences of  interest are monetary  outcomes expressed as  the random variable
M.  Depending upon the economic  context of  the decision problem, the monetary
outcome may be  one of  several variables  such as wealth, income,  gains and
losses,or rate  of  return.  Assuming that a decision maker's preference for
"X amount  of  dollars"  is  unaffected by  the act  from which  it  is  obtained or
state of  nature which occurs,  then U($X|al and s2) =  U($XIa 3 and s5 ).  Hence,
denoting a particular monetary outcome  as m i such that m1 < m2 < m3 ...
means that  (1)  in the  discrete case where i =  1, ... ,  I, a state  is  subscripted
according to  the magnitude of  the monetary outcome  that is  associated with
it,  and  (2)  the  size of  the monetary outcome received directly affects
preferences.  Accordingly, the subscript i on mi  does not  imply  that a state
i has  an effect on preferences.  Moreover, f(m i ) p(si)]  is  the  discrete
probability  (mass) function for the  random variable M.
Assuming  axioms  (i)  - (iii),  the expected utility theorem (mentioned
above) may be written as:
U(a.)  =  EE(m) |aj
I
.L  UL(m.)f(m.)  (for  the discrete  case, given a.)
mI
f  U(m)f(m)dm  (for  the  continuous case,  given a.)
m1 J-6-
where f(m) is  the continuous probability  (density) function of M (as
differentiated from the discrete probability  function  f(mi)).
The nature and shape of  the  utility-of-money function implies certain
properties about  the preferences  of  the decision maker.  First, it  is  gener-
ally assumed  that all  decision makers prefer more money  to  less.  This
implies  that utility increases monotonically as money increases, or  equiva-
lently,  that the marginal utility of  money is  strictly positive  (i.e.,
U (m) > 0).  Second,  to represent certain classes of economic behavior, it
is necessary  to  go beyond  this  assumption to  assumptions about  the  curvature
of  the utility-of-money function.  This occurs because  the desirability of
money does  not always  increase in direct proportion to the  amount  involved
for  all decision makers.  Decreasing marginal utility  of money is  exhibited
by  decision makers who possess utility-of-money functions  that  are concave
to  the money axis.  This property  is  consistent with the preference  of  a
risk averse decision maker.  When the desirability of  money  increases in
direct proportion  to  the amount  involved, the  utility-of-money function is
a straight line and  is  said  to display  constant marginal utility.  This
property is  consistent with the preferences of  a risk neutral decision
maker.  A utility-of-money  function that  exhibits increasing marginal utility
is convex to  the money axis.  This implies  that  the decision maker obtains
increasing increments  of  utility  from each additional unit of money.  This
5/
property is  consistent with  the preferences  of  a risk preferring decision maker.-
Most agricultural decision makers are  considered to  be risk averse
at  least  over  the relevant  range of  outcomes or payoffs.  A risk averter
-/  Mathematically, given U(m)  is  the utility-of-money  function with U (m) > 0,
,.  I*
then U (m)  < 0 for a risk averse, U (m)  =  0 for  a risk neutral, and
U (m) > 0 for  a risk preferring decision maker.-7-
values  a risky prospect at  less  than  its expected monetary value.  In  effect,
the difference between  the expected monetary value  (EMV) and  the  risk
averter's certainty equivalent  (CE)  is  the risk premium  (RP) or cost of
6/ bearing risk  (Figure  ).-  It  follows  that the  risk premium is  positive
for  risk averse,  zero for  risk neutral, and negative  for risk preferring
decision makers.
The degree of  risk aversion that a decision maker possesses can be
uniquely measured by a coefficient  (i.e.,  the Pratt  coefficient)  defined,
for a particular value of monetary outcome,  as  the negative ratio  of  the
second and  first derivatives  of  the utility-of-money  function  Li.e.,
r(m.)  =-U (m.)/U (m.)j.  This  coefficient  (referred to  as  the absolute
2.  1  1
risk aversion coefficient)  is a pure number and  is  invariant  to positive
linear  transformations  of  the  utility function.  As such,  it  can be used
to  compare local risk attitudes among decision makers.  It  follows from
the definition  that  the  Pratt coefficient  is  positive for  risk averse,  zero
for  risk neutral, and negative  for risk preferring decision makers.
A more generalized  concept is  the  absolute risk aversion function,
defined for  all values of monetary outcomes  for which the  utility-of-money
function is  defined and  twice differentiable  Li.e.,  r(m) =  -U  (m)/U (m)].
It has  been shown  that  the  absolute risk aversion function corresponds  uniquely
to  a decision maker's preferences among risky prospects  (Pratt, 1964;  Arrow,
1964).  As  such,  the  absolute  risk aversion function  represents an alterna-
tive  (but not independent) means  for ordering risky prospects.
-/  A certainty equivalent  is  the amount exchanged  with certainty  that  makes
the decision maker indifferent between  this exchange  and  some particular
lottery.  A certainty  equivalent  accounts simultaneously for  the  probabili-
ties  of  the risky  prospects in the  lottery  and  the preferences  for  the
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An  additional characteristic of  absolute  risk aversion  can  be  defined
for risk  averse decision makers.  This  characteristic relates  the  change
in the  absolute risk aversion function  (or coefficient)  to  changes  in  the
decision maker's  initial well-being  (e.g.,  the  initial  level of wealth).
A risk averse  decision maker with a utility-of-money function is  said  to
display decreasing absolute risk aversion if  risk aversion decreases with
increasing  money, constant absolute risk aversion if  risk aversion  remains
constant when money changes, and  increasing absolute risk aversion when risk
7/
aversion  increases with increasing money  (Figure 2).--  It  is  generally
considered  that most risk  averse  decision makers display decreasing  absolute
8/ risk aversion.-
The characteristics  and properties of  the  utility, marginal utility,
and absolute  risk aversion functions  for four commonly used mathematical
forms  (defined over  the  domain 0 to  1000  dollars, with utility values  from
0 to  approximately 100)  are given in Table 1 and illustrated  in Figure  3.
/  Mathematically,  given  an absolute risk aversion function r(m),  with
r(m) > 0 for  risk averse decision makers,  then r (m) < 0 for  a decision
maker displaying  decreasing absolute risk aversion, r (m)  =  0 for
constant absolute risk averse behavior, and  r (m) > 0 for  increasing
absolute risk  averse behavior.
/  It  should be noted  that a positive third derivative of  the  utility function
is  a necessary  (but not  a sufficient) condition  for  decreasing  absolute  risk
aversion.  A positive  third derivative  implies  that  the decision maker



















Figure 2.3  Firm displaying  increasing  absolute  risk aversion.
Illustration of  iso-utility curves  for a  risk averse firm
displaying  various absolute risk aversion properties.
Figure 2  .
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---  ITable  1:  Four Alternative Mathematical Forms of  Utility and Corresponding Absolute Risk Aversion
General Mathematical Form  1
1. Quadratic:U(M) =  amn+bn 2
2. Power:  U(M)= ml
Example U(m)


















3. Log:  U(M)= a log m  14.476  log m
4. Negative Exponential  (1) 100(1-e  )
U(m)= a(1-e cm)
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Each of  the  functions displays diminishing marginal utility  for monetary
gain, risk aversion, but  the  shape of  the  utility  functions and hence of
the marginal utility functions  is  quite different.  The absolute  risk aver-
sion function  is  also quite different  for  the  four mathematical forms.
The  quadratic exhibits  increasing absolute risk  aversion, in contrast  to
the general assumption stated above.  Both  the  power and  the  logarithmic
are relatively simple mathematical  forms displaying decreasing absolute  risk
aversion as  monetary gains  increase.  The  negative exponential has  constant
absolute  risk aversion.  This  simple  illustration emphasizes  the  importance
of  carefully selecting  the mathematical form of  the utility  function when
certain characteristics  of  marginal utility and absolute  risk aversion are
to  be exhibited.
The empirical application of  the expected utility maximization
criterion depends  on knowing  the individual  decision maker's utility function.
Over  the years,  several procedures have been developed  for determining or
eliciting the  preferences  for  risky prospects held by  decision makers  and
estimating  their utility  functions.  These can be  categorized into three
general methods:
(i)  Hypothetical choice method  (ex ante approach):  The decision
maker is asked  to  express his preferences  for monetary  gains and  losses  in
several simple  and hypothetical  lottery situations.  The assumption is made-14-
that the preferences  expressed in the hypothetical setting will  carry  over
to  the more complex real world decision problem.  The responses provided are
then  utilized to empirically estimate  the individual's utility function.  This
approach has been implemented under several formats such as  "Standard
von Neumann-Morgenstern Reference Contract",  "Equally Likely Risky Prospects
and Finding Its Certainty Equivalent  (ELCE)"  and  "Equally Likely but Risky
Outcomes  (ELRO)."  "see Anderson, et  al.,  1977,  pp.  69-76).  These  direct
elicitation schemes have been criticized as being subject  to bias  arising
from misconceptions  of  the notion of probabilities, preferences for  specific
probabilities,  attitudes towards gambling, and  differences  in interviewers
(see Young, et  al.,  1979,  for a review of  the biases in  the measurement of
farmers' risk preferences).
(ii)  Experimental Method  (ex ante approach):  The decision maker
is  asked  to make a single selection among a specified set  of gambles  in which
actual financial  compensation  (at significant levels)  is made.  The  choice
made is used to  compute the nature of  the risk preferences  for  the  individual.
The advantage claimed  for this  approach  is  that it  is  not subject  to  the
biases  associated with the direct  elicitation schemes  (Binswanger, 1978).
(iii)  Revealed preference method (ex post  approach):  The  decision
maker's past decisions are  analyzed (econometrically or with mathematical
programming)  to draw inferences about his  current preferences among risky
prospects.  The assumption is made  that the preferences revealed by  past
decisions  have not  changed and are relevant for  the present decision problem.-15-
Once  the decision maker's utility function is  determined and  the
(subjective) probability  distribution specified,  the  laws  of probability
theory  may be applied  to order  the risky prospects  and identify the most
9/ preferred alternative.-  Often, however, it  is more  convenient  to use  the
moment method or Taylor series  approximation than the  direct use  of  the
probability distribution.  The moment method, which makes  use  of  the  summary
features of  the probability  distribution, approximates  the utility  of a risky
prospect as  a function of  its mean and moments  about the mean  (see Anderson
et  al.,  1977,  pp.  96-99,  for a discussion of  this method).  Generally, only
10/ a finite number of moments are considered in the  analysis.-
III.  THE ORDINARY STOCHASTIC DOMINANCE APPROACH
The decision-theoretic approach  to maximization of  expected utility
described above  is based on  the  assumption that  the preferences  of  the decision
maker are known or  easily obtained  and quantified.  In many practical situa-
tions, however,  one is  confronted with the desire  or necessity  of making a
prediction about  a decision maker's preferences between risky prospects with
9/ - This  technique  of identifying  the most preferred alternative  is  often
referred to  as  the "decision-theoretic" approach.
10/ /-  In empirical applications,  decision analysts have often considered  only
the first two moments  of  the  distribution.  This is  largely due  to  the
existence  of a computerized  solution algorithm.  This approach, called
mean - variance or E-V analysis, was developed by Markowitz  (1952).  Under
the E-V approach, a decision maker is  assumed  to make a series  of  tradeoffs
between expected  return and  risk  as measured by  the variance.  A decision
maker who is  considering a choice between two risky prospects,  al and  a2
is  presumed  to prefer al to  a2 or be indifferent between them if  the mean
of  a1 is  at  least as  large  as  the mean of a2 and the variance of  al is
not  greater  than the  variance  of  a2. If  at  least  one  of  the inequalities
are  strict,  then  al is  preferred to a2 in the strict  sense, and al  is said
to  dominate a2. It  should be noted, however, that the  E-V approach is
consistent with expected utility  analysis  only under  the  following con-
ditions:  (i) the decision maker possesses  a quadratic utility function,
or  (ii)  the  probability distributions  whose moments higher than  the  second
are zero.-16-
ll/
limited  or no knowledge  of  the underlying  utility  function.  Selection of
an arbitrary  function  (or several in a "what  if"  analysis)  by the  decision
theorist may  also be quite unsatisfactory.  Under  these conditions,  the
decision-theoretic approach is of  limited value.
Fortunately,  an alternative  theoretical approach  for efficiency
analysis has been developed for situations  in which little is known about
the  decision maker's preferences.  The approach provides  a means  of ordering
risky prospects  for  groups of  decision makers whose utility functions  possess
similar behavioral properties.  This  approach,based on the  expected
utility maximization framework, does not require a complete  specification
of  the decision maker's utility function and  is  referred  to  as  stochastic
dominance  (SD).
Stochastic dominance  is  said  to  occur  if  the expected utility of
one  risky prospect exceeds  the expected utility of  another  for all possible
utility  functions within a defined class.  Under  the SD  approach, one  is
interested  in defining selection rules  that minimize  the admissible set  of
12/
risky prospects by discarding those  that  are dominated.-  The set  of  risky
prospects  that  are found not  to be  dominated according  to some rule(s) is
referred  to as the stochastically  efficient set.  Generally, the  stochasti-
cally efficient  set will be smaller, the more restrictive are  the behavioral
assumptions  about  the  nature of  the  class of utility functions.
Identification  of  the stochastically efficient set  involves pairwise
comparisons of  cumulative distribution  functions  (CDF)  for  the risky outcomes.
/  This situation is  typical  in  agricultural research,  extension and policy
problems where costs or  expediency are  limitations.
12/2 The set  of  dominated risky prospects is  said  to be inefficient in the
sense  that  they would never be preferred to members of  the dominant  set  by
any expected utility maximizer whose preferences  are characterized by  the
behavioral  assumptions.-17-
It  therefore requires knowledge  of  the entire probability  density functions
13/
(PDF).-  It  utilizes  the  fundamental property  that decision makers prefer
low probabilities  to be associated with less  preferred  outcomes, and high
probabilities  to be associated with more preferred outcomes.  The SD approach
is  applicable when the probability  distributions are either discrete, contin-
uous,  or mixed.
Decision makers whose preferences  belong  to the  defined class  of
utility  functions will find their "best" alternative  for  the decision  problem
in  the stochastically efficient set.  Often, however, this  set may contain
more than  one risky prospect.  Under these circumstances,  some criterion other
than stochastic dominance must  be used  to narrow  the choice  of  acts  to  that
one which will actually be undertaken.  Nevertheless, the  attractiveness of
the  SD  approach is  that  it isolates  a smaller set  of  acts by excluding those
that  are inferior.  This,  in itself,  is of  great value  to decision analysts
since it  reduces  the number  of alternatives  requiring explicit  consideration.
-/  Recall that  a cumulative distribution function F1 (m) defined  for some
continuous random variable M over some closed  interval  iil,mi  is  related
to  its  probability density  function,  f(m),  by Fl(m)  = P(M<m)  =  f(y)dy.
In the  case  of a discrete  distribution where m takes on a finite number of
values m.,  i=l,  ... ,I, the relationship  is  given by Fl(m) = P(M<m) =
I  f(mi.
M<m
To avoid confusion, it  is  useful to clarify  the use of  the letters y and
m in  the integral which defines Fl(m) above.  In an expression such as
(  f(y)dy,  y is  referred to  as  the "variable  of  integration"  and is  used
Jml
to  show that  the  value of  the  integral does  not depend upon the  letter  (y
in  this  case) which  is  used  as  the  variable in the integration procedure.
In situations where  the limits  of integration are alphabetic  symbols, one
should avoid using  the  same  letter for a limit  of  integration as  is  used
for  the  variable of  integration.  Such a situation arises in the definition
of  F1(m).  In this case, m is  used  to  represent  the  idea that  the  cumulative
probability  is  evaluated at any value which may vary over  the  domain of  the
monetary outcomes.  It would be inappropriate  to denote  both the  upper
limit and  the variable of  integration with m, e.g.,  confusion might arise
when one tries  to  evaluate an expression of  the  form  {m  f(m)dm
111Three Alternative  Criteria
Three SD selection rules  have been routinely applied.  (Proofs
of  the  theorems  for  the case of  continuous distributions are  contained  in
the  appendix.)
14 / These rules have a natural progression of more restrictive
assumptions concerning the  nature of  the  underlying utility functions.  They
are  referred to  as  first degree  stochastic dominance  (FSD),  second degree
stochastic dominance  (SSD),  and third  degree stochastic  dominance  (TSD).
First degree stochastic  dominance, originally  developed by Quirk and Saposnik
(1962), attempts  to  order  risky prospects assuming only  that the underlying
utility  functions are monotonically  increasing with respect to  the  utility
argument  (i.e.,  U (m) > 0).  This is  often referred to  as  the  "rationality"
assumption since  it applies  to  all decision makers who  prefer more  to  less.
As  such, FSD  places no restriction on the  nature of  the  risk attitudes, and
consequently,  the risk aversion functions  of  the decision makers.
The  selection rule  for FSD can be  stated in the  following way.  Con-
I  t.
sider  two risky prospects a. and aj,  with cumulative distribution  functions
Fl(m) and Gl(m),  respectively,  defined over  some  closed interval  Em 1, mi  .
TI  i
Now, act  a. is  said  to  dominate act  a. in  the sense  of  FSD if  Gl(m) > Fl(m)
for all possible m in  the defined domain,  and with the  strong inequality holding
for at  least  one m.  In graphical  terms  this rule implies  that  the  cumulative
distribution function of a.,  while it may  touch  the cumulative distribution
function of  aj,  may never lie  to  the  left of  it.
To illustrate  the FSD principle,  consider  the following example.
Suppose a decision maker must choose among five  risky prospects, aj,  j=1,...,5,
(portfolios not allowed) with discrete probability mass  functions b(mi),  d(mi),
14/  Although it  is  possible  to  define fourth and higher  degrees of  SD,  they
are  not pursued  in this paper.  Most of  the higher  degrees of  SD  are
generally not operational and have little intuitive and theoretical
justification.  Interested readers  can consult Hammond  (1974) for  a
discussion of  the higher degrees  of SD.q(mi), w(mi) and  z(mi),  respectively  (Table 2).  The constructed CDF's  for
this example are  shown in Figure 4.  Utilizing  the selection rules  for  FSD,
it  is  obvious  that Dl(m) - Bl(m) >  0 for all possible values of  m.  Thus,
act  a  is  said  to dominate  act  a 2 in terms of  FSD.  This implies  that any
decision maker whose utility function exhibits positive marginal utility will
always  prefer act  a  to  act a2. Similarly,  act a3 dominates  act  a2. The
FSD selection rules  are not  able  to discriminate  among  the remaining risky
prospects.  Thus,  the FSD efficient set  is  composed  of  risky prospects  al,
a3, a  and a5 .
The FSD selection rules  are based on  the weakest  possible assumption
that can be  made about the  underlying utility  functions.  As  such,  it  is  not
theoretically expected to  result  in a small stochastically efficient set.
This  is  because  the FSD selection rule does  not allow one  to  discriminate
between risky prospects whose CDF's  intersect.  The intersection of  CDF's
tends  to be  the  rule rather  than  the  exception in most practical situations.
Therefore,  decision theorists have sought more  restrictive efficiency  con-
cepts  in terms  of  higher degrees of  SD.
The selection rules  for second degree  stochastic dominance were
developed independently by  Fishburn  (1964),  Hanoch and Levy  (1969),  and Hadar
and Russell  (1969).  They provide  the basis  for eliminating  risky prospects
from the stochastically efficient  set developed under the  FSD rules.  In
addition to monotonically increasing  utility functions,  strict  SSD  assumes
risk aversion.  This  implies  that  the  underlying  utility  functions belong  to
the  class  that  exhibit  positive but  decreasing marginal utility  (i.e.,
I  ,I
U (m) >  O, U (m)  < 0).  The absolute  risk aversion functions  for  these
individuals are restricted  to  be  greater  than zero  for  all values  of mone-
tary outcomes in the  defined domain.  As  such, SSD excludes risk neutral
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Figure  4.  Pairwise Comparisons of  Cumulative Distribution Functions  for  First-Degree Stochastic  Dominance.
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The  selection rules which provide  the  necessary  and sufficient
conditions  for SSD can be stated as  follows.  Consider  two risky  prospects
a. and a. with cumulative  distribution functions F (m) and Gl(m),  respectively,
defined over some closed  interval  Lml,  mi.  Define SSD  cumulatives  as
m  m  ,
F2(m) = fF  (y)dy  and G2(m)  G =
I  G(y)dy  for  acts a. and a.,  respectively,
mi  mi
15/
where m is  any m.  [  nM,  mJ  .--  Then act a. is  said  to  dominate act  a. in
terms  of  SSD if  G2(m) >F2(m) for  all possible m, and with the strong  inequality
holding  for at  least one m.  Alternatively  stated,  the risky prospect a. is
3
preferred  to  a. by all decision makers who are  risk averse,  if  and only if,
3
the area under  the  cumulative distribution function of a. never exceeds
and somewhere  lies below the  area under  the cumulative distribution function
of  aj, where  the corresponding areas are evaluated  from m1 through any
possible value of  the random variable greater  than m1.
To  illustrate the  SSD principle,  consider  the  earlier example.  The
calculations  of  the areas  under the  CDF's  for  each of  the  risky prospects
are  contained in Table 2.-  These constructed  relations are  shown in
Figure 5.  Utilizing  the  selection rules  for SSD reveals  that a  stochastically
dominates  a3. This implies  that all decision makers who  are  risk averse
will unanimously prefer  the risky prospect  a, to  a3. Note also  that both a
In the  case  of a discrete distribution
F2(m)  =  - F (mi_)\m.
ink=m i-  2
for  all m in  the  set  (m2,  3 ,...m1  ) and F2(m 1 ) =  0, where  'rm.  =  - .
--  If  the objective  is  to  reduce  the size  of  the  choice set,  then  the  risky
prospects  that are dominated can be dropped  from further analysis.  In
this  example, however, they are carried  along  so as  to  illustrate  the
common properties  of  the  stochastic dominance selection rules discussed
later in the paper.-23-
and a3 stochastically dominate  a2  under  the SSD selection rules.  The SSD
selection rules  are not  able  to  discriminate between  the risky prospects  a  ,
a4 and a5. Consequently, a1, a4 and a5 are members of the  SSD efficient
17/
set.-
The  third degree stochastic dominance  rules were developed initially
by Whitmore  (1970).  In  addition to  the two  previous assumptions,  TSD assumes
that  the third  derivative of  the  underlying utility functions  is  everywhere
I,  f  i
positive  (U (m) > 0,  U (m) < 0, U  (m)  > 0).  This assumption is a condition
that  is  necessary  (but not sufficient)  to suggest  that decision makers display
18/ decreasing absolute  risk aversion.-  As  before,  the  effect of  tightening
the assumptions concerning  the form of  the utility function is  to permit
increased orderability.
The TSD selection rules  are a logical extension of  those  for SSD.
It requires  the definition of  a further type of  cumulative  distribution
function, namely the area under  the SSD  cumulative distribution function:
F3(m ) =  m  19/
F3(m)  I  f  F2 (y)dy.  Now consider a decision maker who  is  asked to  choose
m1
between a  and a2 in this  example.  The E-V rule does  imply that  2 is
preferred  to a4, and  that both al and  a3 are preferred  to  a-.  The E-V
efficient  set  consists of  acts  al, a2 and a3. However, anaiysis  of  any
decision problem using  the expected value and variance of  the distributions
will give similar  results  to  SD  only  if  the consequences follow normal
distributions.  When  the distributions are not normal,  comparisons  of  the
risky prospects  using  the  E-V rule break down.  The  SD rules, however, are
applicable regardless of  the  form of  the distributions.
8/ This  condition  is  equivalent  to  the  restriction that  r'(m) < 0.  Since
r'(m) =  -J"  ((m)  U' m) +  U"(m) _/U'(m) ,  the requirement  that r'(m) < 0
requires  the numerator be negative, since U'(T)  > 0 by assumption.  For
this  condition  to hold, U"' (m) > 0 and U"(m)c  < U'' (m)U'(m)  must hold.
~~~~~~19/  iF2(i)  +F2im
19/  In the  case of  discrete distributions, F3(m) =  L  LF2 (mi) + F2(mi-1)]Ami'
m  mm 2
for  all m in the set  (m2,m3,...,mI) and F3(m1 ) =  .- 22(PI)
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between acts a. and a. with cumulative distribution functions  F!(m)
23  ~~~~~  7
and Gl(m),  respectively, defined over  some closed  interval  u1, m  . Then,
act a. is  said  to dominate  act a. in  terms of  TSD  if  G3 (m)>F 3 (m)  for  all
possible m, with at  least one strong inequality holding, andG2(?)>F(m 1)
where mI is  the  upper limit of  the defined domain.  Stated  in another way,
act a. is  preferred  to  act  a. by  a decision  maker displaying decreasing absolute
risk aversion  if  the  "cumulative of the cumulative"  of  the CDF of  a. never
It
exceeds  that of  a. for  all values of the random variable, and  the  total area
under  the  CDF  of a. is  less  than or equal  to  the  total area under the  CDF
of a.  20/
To  illustrate the  TSD principle, again consider  the hypothetical
example.  The calculations of  the areas under  the  SSD  CDF's  for  the  risky
prospects are also  contained  in Table  2.  These constructed  relationships
are shown in Figure  6.  Utilizing  the selection rule  for  TSD  reveals  that
al  stochastically dominates  a2, a3 and a5 but  the  rule  is  not  able  to  dis-
criminate between the risky prospects  al  and a4. Furthermore, a3 dominates
a2 and a5 under  the TSD selection rules.  Consequently, both al  and a4 are
members of  the TSD efficient  set.
In general,  the FSD, SSD,  and TSD  orderings  for a decision problem
21/
have certain properties or  relations  in  common.  These include:-2
(i) Asymmetry - if act a  dominates a2 by FSD  (SDD or TSD),  then  it
is  not true that act a2  dominates  al  in  terms of  the same degree of  SD.
20/ Vickson  (1975)  has  developed a stronger  selection rule, decreasing  absolute
risk aversion Stochastic Dominance,  (DSD) based  on the  behavioral assumption
of  decreasing  absolute risk aversion which attempts to  further narrow the
stochastically efficient set.  He has  shown that DSD and TSD are equivalent
for  random variables  having equal means, and  that DSD  is  the stronger ordering
for  random variables having unequal means.  At  present, however,  the selection
rules  are  limited  to discrete probability distributions.  Furthermore,  the
additional computational requirements necessitate its  implementation only
by algorithmic procedures.
21/  These properties  can be verified  (but not  proven) by referring  to  the
numerical example discussed  above.- B3(m)
----  Q(m)
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(ii)  Transitivity - if act  a1 dominates act  a2, and act  a2 dominates
act  a3 in terms  of  FSD  (SSD or TSD),  then act al  dominates act a3  in terms
of  the same degree of  SD.
(iii)  Partial ordering - the  dominance relations  imply  that  the  set
of  utility functions  comprising a class  for  one degree of  SD  contains  the  set
of  utility  functions  comprising a class  for a higher degree of  SD, but not
conversely.  In other words,  this  implies that  if  a1 dominates  a2 by FSD,
then a  dominates a2 by  SSD,  and al dominates a2 by TSD also,  but the  reverse
does not hold.
(iv)  Necessary conditions - the necessary, but not sufficient,
conditions for  FSD, SSD or  TSD to hold are  that  the lower bound of  the
cumulative distribution function for  the dominant  act  not be  less than for
the dominated act, and  the mean of the  dominant act  not be  less  than  that of
the dominated act.
Up  to  this point in the discussion of  the SD  approach, only  "pure"
prospects have been considered.  Nothing has been said about  possible mix-
tures  of  pure prospects  (i.e.,  linear combinations of  random variables).
Under  the SD approach, simple mixtures can be handled by specifying  the prob-
ability density  functions  for  the mixtures and  testing  these in a similar
manner as  for pure prospects.  Considerable difficulty  is often encountered
however,  in specifying the probability  distributions for  the mixed pros-
22/
pects  unless they happen to be normally distributed. 2/
22/
- Fishburn (1974) has developed a set  of  selection rules  for  a particular
class  of linear  (convex) combinations  of cumulative distribution
functions  (note these do  not relate to  linear combinations  of  random
variables described above).  The selection rules are referred  to  as
convex stochastic dominance  (CSD).  The CSD rules, however, require
that  the analyst assume more about  the  decision maker's preferences
than was assumed above.  In addition, CSD involving continuous  dis-
tributiors is  complicated by  the fact that  linear combinations  of
CDF's  do not necessarily belong  to  the same family as  the  individual
parent  distributions.  The SD results have also been extended  to  include
multi-periods and multi-choice decision situations  (Levy and Paroush,
1974a, b).  However, these  extensios  are severely  restricted by the
lack of computerized  computational  routines to  facilitate their
en  iric 1  imolementation.-28-
Empirical Applications of  the Ordinary Stochastic Dominance  Approach
Empirical decision problems can be categorized into  two broad groups
based on the number  of actions being considered.  These are  referred  to  as
(i) discrete - those where only a finite number of  risky prospects are  being
considered, and  (ii)  continuous  - those  where the  number of actions  open to  the
decision maker are logically infinite.  Application of  the  SD selection rules
are most  straightforward  in  the case of  discrete decision problems.  For
decision problems  that are  inherently  continuous, application of  the SD
rules  conceptually involves  an infinite number of  comparisons of CDF's.
To  get  around  this, most continuous decision problems  are  "discretized" in
such a way that  the  essence of  the original problem is  not  lost.  This
normally  consists of  using linear segments  to  approximate  the continuous
probably distributions.
For small decision problems,  tabular or  graphical procedures can be
used  to  identify the stochastically efficient sets  (see illustrative examples
above).  However, when  the decision problem involves  a large number of  pairwise
comparisons of  CDF's,  the computational requirements necessitate the use of
high speed computerized algorithms.  Such devices  for obtaining  the  stochas-
tically efficient sets are  outlined for discrete distributions  in  Anderson,
et  al.,  (1977), Levy and Hanoch  (1970), Levy  and Sarnat  (1970),  and Porter
et  al.,  (1973).
Most of  the empirical  applications of ordinary SD  to date relate  (very
naturally)  to  portfolio and financial management problems.  Prior  to  the
development  of  the  SD  rules,  numerical analysis of  these decision problems
utilized  the Markowitz  - 2  moment model  (i.e.,  E-V analysis).  As  pointed out
earlier,  this approach has several major disadvantages. However,  it  also
has the major advantage of  requiring little computational  effort.  Early
empirical studies  (since the  introduction of  the  SD  approach)  generally-29-
consisted of  comparisons  of the  efficient sets under the E-V and  SD
selection rules.
The study by  Porter and Gaumnitz  (1972)  compared E-V, FSD,  SSD,
and  TSD efficient sets  for each of  three  different sets  of  commercially
available stocks  covering different  time periods.  Of  the  893 portfolios
examined,  198 were efficient by  FSD,  40 by  SSD, and.31  by TSD rules.  The
E-V efficient set contained  39  portfolios,  24 of  which were members of  the
SSD  efficient set.  Generally,  the results  of the  study demonstrated a ten-
dency for  the SSD  and TSD selection rules  to eliminate the  low return -
low variance portfolios  that were included in the E-V efficient  set.  In
addition, it  showed  the  relative  ineffectiveness of the FSD rule  in reducing
the size of  the stochastically efficient  set.  In another study  involving
the returns  from 138 individual  stocks, Levy and Hanoch  (1970)  found  that
the E-V and SSD  efficient sets were remarkably  similar in  terms of  the
number of  stocks  in  each  set but not  in terms  of  the  identity of  the members
of the different sets.  They found the E-V approach could result in
choices  of  portfolios  that were inconsistent  with the goal of maximizing
expected utility.  They concluded that  the  SSD and  TSD portfolios were
superior to  the E-V choices  and,  furthermore,  that FSD was not very effective in
ordering risky prospects.  The results of  other similar comparative  studies
involving portfolio and  financial management  decisions,  e.g. Porter and
Carey  (1974),  Levy and Sarnat  (1970),  have generally confirmed these  findings.
Applications of  ordinary SD  to agricultural decision problems have been few.
Anderson  (1974)  used  this approach to  evaluate the  impact of  different
degrees of  risk aversion on  "risk efficient"  fertilizer rates  for dryland
wheat production.  The analysis  considered 36 nitrogen-phosphorous  combira-
tions  wherein  the probability density  functions were derived  from sparse-30-
data.  The  FSD efficient  set contained  20  fertilizer  combinations, whereas
the  SSD and  TSD efficient sets each contained 7 fertilizer  combinations
(i.e.,  the TSD rules  did not eliminate any acts from the  SSD efficient set).
The E-V efficient set was  comprised of 8 fertilizer  combinations,  7 of which
were also members  of  the SSD  efficient set.  In  another agricultural  appli-
cation involving 49  spring wheat varieties,  SD was  used  to  identify  those
varieties that  had the widest environmental adaptability  from the point
of view of  risk averse growers  (CIMMYT,  1972).  Results of  the  analysis
indicated that  27  varieties were members  of  the FSD efficient  set.  The SSD
and TSD efficient  sets were comprised of  6 and  5 varieties,  respectively.
The results of  these and  other  empirical studies  (not reported  in
this  paper)  involving the  application of  the ordinary  SD approach have
revealed several  common characteristics.  These  can be summarized as  follows.
The FSD rules were  of  rather limited effectiveness  in reducing the size of
the original  sample.  The  SSD rules were much more  effective than the FSD
rules, generally reducing the  stochastically efficient set  to a manageable
size.  The TSD  rules did little  to further reduce the  size of  the  stochastie-
23/
ally  efficient set.3/  Compared  to the E-V efficient set,  the SSD efficient
set was  similar in size but was  often different  in membership.  The E-V
efficient set generally included some elements  that were eliminated  by  the
SSD rules.  Finally, the  SD criterion was generally more difficult  to apply
to  the decision problems  than was  the E-V criterion.
23/ This  finding depends heavily on the nature of  the  probability distribu-
tions involved.-31-
IV.  THE GENERALIZED STOCHASTIC DOMINANCE APPROACH
An interesting and useful extension of  the ordinary SD  principles
has been developed by Meyer  (1977a, b).  This extension, referred to as  SSD
with respect  to  a function or Meyer's criterion, is  a generalization  of  the
ordinary  SD rules  as  presented in Section III.  Meyer's criterion  adds
greater  flexibility and discriminating power  to  the ordinary SD principles.
It  represents a rule or procedure for  ordering a pair of risky prospects  for
particular groups or  classes of decision makers  defined by an upper and
lower bound on  their absolute risk aversion functions.  These bounds specify
an  interval in risk aversion space  that can be as wide or  as narrow as  is
deemed necessary  for a particular  decision problem.  Negative as well  as
positive  levels  of absolute  risk aversion can be included  in this  interval
at  some or  all values  of monetary outcomes  in  the defined  domain.  Meyer's
criterion provides  a calculation procedure that  gives  the necessary and
sufficient conditions  for one distribution to  be preferred or  indifferent
to  another by  all decision makers whose absolute risk aversion functions
fall within  the given  interval.
As  discussed  in  the previous section, first degree stochastic dominance
(FSD) restricts  the group  of  decision makers  to  those who prefer more  to
less;  i.e.,  to  all agents having positive marginal utility for  money
(U'(m) > 0).  More precisely, if  no  restrictions on agent's preferences
other  than those imposed by assuming U(m) is  increasing and  twice differen-
tiable are  specified,  then  FSD provides the necessary and  sufficient conditions
,l
on Fl(m)  and Gl(m)  for act  a.  to be preferred  or  indifferent  to  act  aj
24/
by all such decision makers.-  This condition imposes  no  restrictions on
the decision maker's  (or a set  of decision makers')  absolute risk aversion
24/
- Recall  that a. and a. are  two  risky prospects with cumulative distribution
functions F1 (  )  and Gl(m),  respectively, defined  over some closed  interval
r_-  -7  1LJ
iml mI I-32-
function  interval;  i.e.,  the lower  bound rl(m)  =  - and  the  upper bound,
r2(m) = +X.  These results are said  to be  in closed form since neither an
upper nor a lower bound is  specified in  the decision maker's  absolute risk
aversion function over  the defined domain of monetary outcomes.  That  is,
all decision makers who prefer more  to  less will be unanimous in choosing
the dominant risky prospect.
Second  degree stochastic dominance  (SSD) restricts  the group of
decision makers  to  those who  are risk averse, meaning that  their marginal
utility  for money is  positive and decreasing  (i.e.,  U'(m) > O, U"(m)  < 0).
This condition implies  that  the corresponding absolute risk aversion func-
tion interval  is  rl(m) > 0 and r2(m) =  +X.  The rules of  SSD characterize
those pairs of risky prospects for which risk averse  decision makers are
unanimous  in preferring one over  the other.  These results  are also in
closed form  in that no upper bound  is  given on the decision maker's measure
of  risk aversion.
Third  degree stochastic dominance  (TSD) further restricts  the set
of  decision makers  to  those who have decreasing absolute risk aversion, i.e.,
in addition to  the previous  restrictions on the  utility functions, a necessary
condition  for TSD is  that  the decision maker's  utility function have a
positive third derivative  (i.e.,  U"' (m) > 0).  In absolute  risk aversion
space, TSD implies the  same absolute risk aversion interval as  SSD, but
with r(m) decreasing with increases in money.
Meyer's  Criterion
Meyer  (1977b) generalized  the ordinary stochastic dominance rules
egi  aven  above by finding  the  necessary and  sufficient conditions for  choosing
between a pair  of risky prospects when either a lower  or an upper bound on
the  risk aversion  of a decision maker is  known.  These conditions, given  first
for the  situation when only a lower bound, rl(m),  is  specified, are  stated
in  the  following theorem:Theorem  1:  For  any  r  (m)  =-Ul(m)/Ul(m),  a. is  preferred  or
1  J
it
indifferent  to  a. by  all  decision  makers  in  the  set  S(rl(m),  +X),
if  and  only  if,
(1)  Jm  EG(y)-F1  (y)  Ui(y)dy  >  0,  V  me  ,l1  .
To  simplify  the  notation  the  monetary  outcomes  have  been  normalized
over  the  domain  L0,1:.  Equation  1  measures  the  difference  between  the  expect-
ed  utilities  corresponding  to  the  distributions  Fl(m)  and  G (m)  evaluated
from  0  to  .25/  The  integrals  of  Theorem  1  and  the  following  theorems  are
all  Lebesque  - Stieltjes  integrals.  This  form  of  integral  is  commonly  used
with  two  functions  - one  which  is  continuous  (e.g.,  the  utility
of  m)  and  the  other  which  has  discrete  changes  (e.g.,  the  difference  in  the
26/
two  distributions)  - both  defined  over  the  same  domain.-
25/  Proof:  Let f(m) and  g(m) be the  probability density functions associated
with Fl(m) and Gl(m),  respectively,  then
If fmUd(m)U(m)dm  - g(m)U(m)dm=  (m)-g(m)]  U(m)dm is
the difference between the  expected utilities  associated with  the  two
distributions.
Integrating by parts:
o 1 f(m) - g(m)]  U(m)dm =  Fl(m)  - Gl (m)¶  U(m)  o  J  L(m)  - Gl(m)] U'(m)dm
=  Go 1 lG(m)  - Fl (m)]  U'(m)dm - ErU(m)  - U  - ErU(m)1G  "
since  LF 1(o) - G1 (o)]  and  1Fl(1) - G1 (l 1) are both equal  to  zero.
26/ A good  introduction  to  the use and properties  of  Stieltjes  integration
can be found in Taylor and  Mann (1978,  pp.  592-97),  and  Lindgren  (1978,
pp.  101-105).
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Using the more general notation of  Meyer's Second Degree Stochastic
27/
Dominance with Respect  to a Function, SSD(k),-  Theorem 1 can be expressed
in the  following more compact notation:
Theorem 1':  For  cumulative distributions F (m) and Gl(m),
f  CG 1(y) - Fl(y)]  dk(y) > 0, V me 0,l],  if  and only  if,
f1 U(m)dF l(m) > f 1 U(m)dG (m)
-k"  (m)
for  all U(m)sS( k(), +  ).
Tr~~~~~~~~~  It
This  theorem implies  that a. stochastically dominates a. in  the
second degree with respect  to  k(m),  or "F SSD(k) G",  where k(m) is  a utility
function representing a lower bound  in risk aversion space,  i.e.,
-k"(m)/k'(m) = -U"(m)/U{(m)  = r1(m).  Given the above  theorem, a group  of
decision makers' preferences between a. and a. can be predicted knowing  only
that their measure of  risk aversion is greater  than r  (m).  This result  is
in closed  form similar  to  the results  of second  degree SD.  That  is,  there
is  no upper bound on the decision makers' risk aversion, implying  that all
decision makers more risk averse than rl(m) will be  unanimous  in preferring
T  ,I
a. to  a..  This lower bound can be negative  (implying risk preference),  zero
3  3
(implying risk neutrality)  or  positive  (implying risk aversion).
An additional result of  the above  theorem is  the implication that
t  t,
beginning with a pair  of  risky prospects, a. and  aj,  SSD(k) can be used  to
characterize  the  set  of  decision makers who prefer or are  indifferent between
I  IT  T
a. and a..  That  is,  one need only to  find  a utility  function such that  aj
27/  (1977b  p. 480)  denoted Second Degree  Stochastic Dominance with - Meyer (1977b, p. 480) denoted  Second Degree Stochastic Dominance with
Respect to  a Function as SSD(k) and "F SSD(k) G" is  read "F (m) sto-
chastically dominates G1(m) in the  second degree with respect to  k(m)",
where k(m) is a utility function defined over the given domain of mone-
tary outcomes.-35-
stochastically dominates a. by all decision makers with utility functions more
risk averse  than k(m).  The proof  that such a k(m) exists  is  given by Meyer
(1975c) who proved that if  LGl(m)  - Fl(m)  changes  sign a finite number of
times over  the domain  of  m, then  there exists an  increasing, twice  differ-
98/
entiable k(m) such that "F SSD(k) G",  or  that "G SSD(k) F",  but not both. 8/
Meyer also developed  a set of  similar  conditions  for an upper
bound, r2(m).  These results are  summarized  in the  following theorem:
Theorem 2:  For  any r2(m) = -U2(m)/U2(m),  a. is  preferred or  in-
3
different  to  aj  by all agents  in the set  S(-=,  r2(m)),  if  and only  if,
Jf  F  F(Y)  - G1 (y)U 2 (y)dy > 0  V me:  il. fm  (l)  U 2 
L ° 
v -
This theorem implies  that all agents  less risk averse  than r2(m)  are unanimous
in preferring a. to a..  Theorem 2 was rewritten more  compactly by Meyer
(1977b, p. 482) as  follows:
Theorem 2':  For cumulative distributions F (m)  and G (m),
1  1
1  1G  (y)  - F  (y)] dk(y) < 0,  m  1,l],  if  and only  if,
1 U(m)dF  (m) < [1  U(m)dGl(m) for  all  U(m)e  SE-,  -k"(m)/k'  (m)]  29
This theorem has implications  similar to  Theorem 1',  except  they are with
respect  to  an upper bound, r2(m),  and  refer  to  agents  less  risk averse  than
this bound.  That  is,  Theorem 2' allows  for:  (i) the prediction of a decision
maker's  choice between a. and a. when only r (m)  is  known,  (ii)  a result
which  is in  closed  form since the  lower bound is not  specified, and  (iii)
28/ If  CGl(m)  - F (m)] does  not  change sign a finite number of  times over  the
relevant domain of m, then  a boundary function does not exist.  This
condition is  equivalent  to  the rules  of  FSD  (Meyer 1975,  p. 126).
9/ The proof  of Theorem 2' is  given by Meyer  (1977b, pp.  484-6).-36-
II
the  restatement of  the problem as  one of  finding a k(m) such that a. SD
a. by allagents with utility functions less risk averse than k(m).
Having proven the  two  theorems  given above, Meyer  (1977b, p. 483)
combined  them into  the following theorem:
Theorem  3:  For  cumulative distributions F (m)  and  G (m)
m
(1)  Jo  (1  (y)  - Fl(y)]dk(y) >  0  VmcE [,l  and
1
(2)  /o  G1(m)  - Fl(m)]dk(m) =  0  only if
1
(3)  /m CG 1(y)  - F1(y)]dk(y) <  VmcE  ,1<.
!  ..
This  theorem says a. is  at  least as preferred as  a. by all decision
makers with utility  functions  more risk averse than k(m) defined  over  the
range of  normalized monetary outcomes 0 to  m.  Furthermore, decision makers
I  M
with utility functions  equal  to  k(m) are  indifferent between a  and  a. for
,n:3  3
all mc0,l].  These conditions hold only  if a. is preferred  or  indifferent
to a. by all agents  less  risk averse than k(m) over the  range mi to  1.  In
other words, k(m) serves as  a boundary function separating  those decision
I  l?  I!  !
makers who prefer  a. to a. from the set who  prefer a. to a..  Therefore,
3  J3  3
if  for a particular F (m)  and Gl(m),  one  can find a k(m) such that Thoerem
3 holds, then this partially characterizes  (i)  those decision makers who
»  ,t
prefer a. to  a. by  the fact  that  they include all  those more risk averse
:3  :3
than k(m) and  (ii)  those agents who prefer  a. to aj  by the  fact that  they
3
include all those less risk averse than k(m).  Therefore,  given only  the
knowledge  that  the decision makers  are more or  less risk averse  than the
boundary function given by k(m),  the  optimal choice between a. and  aj  can be
3  3
predicted.  Moreover, the  problem of  predicting the  choice between two  risky
prospects can be transformed  into  the problem of  determining whether  the-37-
decision makers are more or  less risk averse than k(m),  by  identifying a
k(m) satisfying the  conditions of  Theorem 3 for  a particular F (m)  and Gl(m).
Meyer  (1977a) extended  the above problem of  finding a single boundary
utility  function  to the  more general problem of  finding a utility function
that  minimizes  the difference between  the expected utilities  of  a pair of
risky prospects when both a lower and  an upper bound  on  a decision maker's
absolute  risk aversion function  are specified.  To  solve this problem, Meyer
used  a solution procedure that  is  derived  from Theorem 3.  This procedure
provides a method for  predicting  the choice between two  distributions when
it  is known only that  the decision maker's risk aversion function  lies
between an arbitrarily set rl(m) and r2 (m)  defined over a  given domain
of monetary outcomes.  The procedure requires  the identification of a utility
function, U (m),  which minimizes
(4)  fo  G1 l(m) - Fl(m)] U'(m)dm
subject  to  the constraints:
(5)  rl(m)  <  -U"(m)/U'(m) <  r(m),  VmsE  ,l 1  o  o  2
1  30/ (6)  U (0)  = 1. 3
Given  that equation 4 equals  the expected utility associated with
F (m)  minus  the  expected utility corresponding to Gl(m),  the minimization
process  requires the  difference between  the expected utilities  of  the  two
choices  to be as  small as possible.  Therefore, all  other decision makers with
risk aversion functions within the  defined absolute risk aversion interval
would have a difference  in expected utility  greater  than the  amount calculated.
3-  Equation 6 is a harmless normalization procedure which removes  the
indeterminacy due to  the  fact  that a single minimum will not exist since
U(m) is  unique only to a positive  linear transformation  (i.e.,  equation
4 has multiple solutions  without the additional constraint).-38-
Given this condition,  the following preference orderings  can be  specified
for  the particular  set of  decision makers  defined by S(rl(m),  r2(m))  according
to Theorem 3:
(i)  If  the  minimum of  this  difference is  positive,  then a. is
I!
unanimously preferred to a. for  the  particular set  of  decision makers.
J
(ii)  If  the minimum is  zero,  then  the decision makers in the partic-
ular  set are said  to be indifferent between the  two  activities and  they  cannot
be ordered.
(iii)  If  the minimum is  negative, then the  particular  set  of  decision
makers  does  not unanimously prefer  a. to  a..
J  J
If  the  last situation occurs, equation  (4) is  changed to:
(4')  J1 l(m) - GL(m):  U'(m)dm
and minimized subject  to  equations  (5) and  (6) to determine whether a. is
unanimously preferred  to a. for  the same set of decision makers.  If a.
is  shown not  to  be unanimously preferred or  indifferent  to  a. (i.e.,  equation
4' is  also negative),  then the  two  activities  cannot be  ordered.  Thus,  a
complete ordering  is not ensured by this  procedure.
Meyer  (1977a, pp.  331-3),  using  the  absolute risk aversion function,
r (m),  as  the  control variable and U (m)  as  a state variable, reformulated
o
the above problem into  the specified optimal control  framework used by Arrow
and  Kurz  (1970,  pp.  39-45);  i.e.,
Maximize the  objective function
(6)  -f1 jG(m) - F,(m)  U'(m)dm
subject  to
(7)  the equation of  motion4
(U(m))  =  Utm)L  -r(m)
(8)  the  constraints on  the  control,
r (m) - r (m) >  0
-ro(m) +  r2 (m) >  0
(9)  and  the  initial condition,
U' ()  =  1-39-
This problem minimizes  the difference  in  expected  utility between
F  im)  and  Gl(m) with respect  to  r (m).  The relevant  properties of a solution
to  this  optimal control problem  (derived from  the Hamiltonian conditions)
do  not provide a closed  form solution for  characterizing the  unanimous
preference ordering by all decision makers in  the  set  S  Lr(m), r2(m)].  This
occurs because both a lower  and upper bound are specified.  That  is,  within
this  interval, rl(m)  to r2(m),  there  are decision makers who are more risk
averse than rl(m)  and,  at  the  same time, decision makers who are less  risk
laverse  than r2(m).  Therefore, the risk aversity of  this set of  decision
makers cannot be completely  characterized with respect  to a single  boundary
function.  Nevertheless, the  given properties of  the optimal  control problem
do  provide a procedure for determining  the preference  ordering between a
31/
particular pair of  risky prospects  for the  given set  of  decision makers.-1
Meyer  (1977a, p. 333)  gave  the following  theorem as  the basis  for
this  procedure:
Theorem 4:  An optimal control r (m)  which minimizes
fJ  )  FGl)  U(m)  - F(  (m)dm
subject  to  the  constraints:
rl)  r (m) < r2(m)
u'(O)  =  1
o
is  given by
r(m)  if  j1
m G(y)  - F1 (y)] U'(y)dy < 0
r (m)=
om  0
r r2(m)  if  fm  G 1 (y) - F1 (y)]  U'(y)dy > 0
3/  The procedure solution assumes  that  rG,  (m)  - Fl(m)]  changes sign a finite
number of  times over  the  interval  01_O which was  shown earlier  to  be  the
necessary and sufficient conditions  for  the existence of  a boundary function.-40-
Theorem 4 is Meyer's criterion and  implies  that r (m) always has  the
0
solution value of  either  the  lower or upper bound,  i.e.,  the control
problem is of  the "bang-bang" type.  Furthermore, the ro(m)  that minimizes
the difference between  the expected utilities associated with F (m)  and  Gl(m)
is  determined at any point m. by  the size  of  the objective function integrated
from m. forward to  one.  Thus,  if  the solution  from m. forward is  known,
the preference ordering at m. and,  therefore, over  the  entire specified
32/
domain,  can be determined.32
Theorem 4 implies  that  if  the difference in the expected utility of
I.  I
F (m)  minus  Gl(m) is  negative  (i.e.,  a. is  preferred  to  aj)  for  a range of
monetary outcomes  from mi forward,  then  the optimal control variable to  use
in  continuing the  integration calculation  is  the lower  absolute risk aversion
function.  Using  the lower bound risk aversion function assigns  the maximum
U'(m) within the [l(m),  r2(m)_ interval in risk aversion space.  In other
words, r (m) is  the risk aversion function that minimizes  the difference
between the  expected utilities of  F (m)  and  Gl(m).  This result  is  derived
1.  1
from Theorem 3 which showed that a. would be preferred to  aj  by all decision
makers less risk averse than a given boundary function.  In this case, since
the minimum difference  in expected utility between F (m)  and Gl(m) is nega-
tive and a. is  preferred  to a. by all decision makers less risk averse than
the upper bound, r2(m),  then the r (m)  which ensures  that  aj  is preferred to
a. is the  lower bound, rl(m).  This  condition holds because this bound
represents  the minimum risk aversion function where all  agents more risk
t  I,
averse  unanimously prefer  aj  to  a.,  (even the decision maker  least prone  to
choose aj).
32/
32/  The solution is  simpler  to derive if  the  integration procedure  is  started
at  the highest monetary outcome and  solved  from the highest  to  the lowest
value.-41-
Conversely, if  the minimum difference  in the expected utility between
Fl (m) and Gl(m)  is positive or  equal to  zero,  Meyer's criterion states  that
the optimal control should be  the upper bound, r2(m);  i.e.,  the risk aversion
function that  assigns  the  smallest U'(m) within the Fl(m),  r2(ml interval.
Given that this  difference  is  positive  (or zero),  a. is  preferred
I,
(or indifferent)  to a. by Theorem 3.  The argument  to  ensure that  this
J
ordering is  preserved  is similar  to  the one  presented above.  However,  in
this case, the  upper bound, r2(m),  representing  the maximum bound where a.
is unanimously preferred  (or indifferent)  to a. by all decision makers  less
risk averse becomes  the optimal control variable.
Following the integration calculation procedure described  above,
Meyer's criterion provides  a method  for determining the preference  ordering
between a pair  of risky prospects for a particular  set  of  decision makers
defined  arbitrarily by  S(rl(m),  r2 (m)).33  That  is,  the sign  of  the difference
in the expected utility between  the two  distributions can be  derived by
integrating  from the  highest value of m back to  the  lowest value over  the
defined domain.  Then according  to  the rules  of Theorem 3, the preference ordering
can be determined.  If  the  sign of  the value  of  the minimum difference  is positive,
I  .I
then the particular  set of  decision makers  prefers a. to a..  If  the value
i  1n
is  zero,  then the  set of  decision makers  is  indifferent between a. and a.
3  3
and  the activities cannot be ordered.  If  the value is  negative, then the
I  .I
set  of decision makers does not  prefer  a. to at. wnen tne  latter condition
occurs,  the integration procedure starts  over after changing  the  signs of
the  differences between F (m) and G (m).  This procedure determines whether
3/ Recall  that the  relevant domain of m has  been normalized  to  a  E0,1l
interval.  Therefore, the  preference ordering  is  given only over this
defined domain.-42-
I.  I  I  t  I
aj  is  preferred  to aj,  aj  is  preferred to  a.,  or  if  there  is  indifference
between the two  activities for  the given set  of  decision makers  over  the
defined domain of  monetary outcomes.
Since the  integration procedure can be  calculated  for  any set  of
decision makers  (i.e.,  where rl(m)  and r2(m) may be  changed  to any desired
level),  an iterative process  that assumes different values of  rl(m)  and
!  .1
r2(m) may be  used until indifference  is  found between a. and  a..  This
iterative  process  theoretically can be used  to  solve  the related problem of
34/
finding a boundary function in  risk aversion space.-
With  the assumption that  such a boundary function exists,  the
iterative process described above can first provide a boundary  interval in
risk aversion space defined by rl(m)  and r2(m) where the  difference between
the expected utilities of  the  two distributions  is  zero,  or where neither
I  IT  i!  I
a. is  preferred to  a. nor a. is preferred  to  a. by  the defined set  of decision
makers.  The boundary interval could  then be  further narrowed  by a similar
iterative process  that would  concentrate on  further divisions within the
given interval.  Theoretically, this process  could be repeated many times
to derive a single boundary function, r (m),  since  the process would eliminate:
(i)  all higher intervals in risk aversion space where a. would be preferred
to  a. by all decision makers more risk averse  than r (m),  and  (ii)  all lower
1  0t
intervals where a. would be preferred  to  a. by all decision makers  less risk
2  2
averse  than r (m).
o
To illustrate the  integration procedure  of Meyer's criterion, let
us  return to  the  original problem of  predicting the  choice between a pair of
34/ Recall that  a boundary function may not exist  in  risk aversion space  if
1Gl(m)  - Fl(m)]  does not  change sign over the  relevant  interval.-43-
risky prospects for  a particular set of  agents.  Consider the numerical
example of  Section III.  This  example considers  the discrete cumulative
distribution functions  (given in Table  2) where the monetary outcomes  are
defined over the domain  C0,10.-35/  In the  previous analysis, the  selection
rules for TSD revealed  that al  stochastically dominates  a2, a3, and a-,
but that TSD was not able  to discriminate between the  risky prospects al  and
a4 . The two cumulative distribution functions, Bl(m) and Wl(m) for  al  and
a4,  respectively, have been redrawn in Figure 6 with the difference
l  (m)  - B (m) l between the two  shown in the lower  graph.
Meyer's criterion  is used  in an attempt  to  order these two  distribu-
tions  for a particular class  of  decision makers defined by  the set
S(rl(m),  r2(m)).  To  facilitate the  calculation procedure let us  assume
the particular group  of  decision makers  are designated by  the  lower  and upper
bounds  on the absolute risk aversion functions  that  are constants over  the
entire given domain of m.  A utility  function consistent with the specified  constant
bounds on  the absolute risk aversion functions can be  shown to  be of  the
negative exponential  form  (Freund, 1956).  This  can be written as
-r .m
(11)  Uj(m) =  -e  j  =  1, 2
where r. is  the lower  or upper bound absolute risk aversion level, respec-
tively.  For  this  example,  let  us  assume  r  .01 and  r2 =  .02.
To rank  the  two activities, a l and a4, for  the  given set of  agents,
S(.01,  .02), Meyer's criterion follows  the procedure of  integrating  from the
highest  to  the  lowest value of m.  Therefore,  the procedure begins by  solving
the  integral for M > 9 which is  the  first  interval in  [m.,  10]  where
5Although  the above description has  used continuous probability  density
functions,  it  clearly carries over  to cases  of  discrete distributions by
a simple modification of  the  above results  by identifying integration
as an appropriate summation.-44-
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Lwl(m)  - Bl ( m ) 1 does  not  change  sign.  Since  the  sign  of  LW(m) - B l (m)]
is  positive for M > 9,  the  upper  bound,  r2 is  used  as  the  optimal  control
~~~36/  ~-r  .m
as stated  in Theorem 4.  Thus, using U (m)  =  -e  ,  which implies U'(m)  =
002m
.02e  ,  and  calculating  the  value  of  the  objective function from m  9  to
infinity gives
+4o  10 10 0 ---. 02m
J9 I,(m) - Bl(m)J  U'(m)dm =  g  (+.2)(.02e-  )dm
= -.02m  10
=  -. 2e  1
-. 2  -. 18
=  -.2(e  - e 
8 )
=  +  .00331
This value is  positive, since  the value of  the integral  is  zero over  the
range where  wl(m)  - Bl(m)I  =  0.  Therefore,  the solution rule indicates
that the  optimal control  remains at r2 =  .02 over the range of  m back  to  the
point where m. =  6.  At  this  point  the solution value is  given by
f 6 W  l(m)  - Bl (m)] U'(m)dm =  6  (-.2)(.02e  '  )dm +  .00331
-. 02m
=  +  .2e  - 2 +  .00331
=  -. 0002
which is negative.  This  implies  that  the  optimal control switches  to  rl =  .01
as  the procedure continues back to  the point where mi  =  3.  At  this point
+00  4 -Oli j3  l  (m) - Bl(m)] U'(m)dm = 3 (+.3)(.O01e-  )dm - .0002
O  4
=  -. 3e 
0 - .0002 13
=  +  .0027
36/  Recall  that  the objective  is  to minimize  the difference between  the
expected  utilities  of  the  two  distributions  and  that  selecting r2(m)
results  in  assigning  the  lowest  U (m).  Selecting  r2(m) minimizes  the
difference in  utility over  the  range m  =  9  to  +o.-46-
This value  is positive and  implies  that  the  optimal control switches  back to
r  =  .02 as  the procedure continues back to  the point where m. =  2.  At  this
point
-. 02m
'2  LWl(m) - B (m)] U'  (m)dm =  2 (+ .2)(.02e  )dm +  .0027
3
= -.2e  02m +  .0027
2
= +  .0065
which  is also  positive.  This implies  that  the  optimal control remains at
r 2 .02 as  the procedure continues back to  the  point where mi  =  0.  At
this point
+c  1
f  w 1 ,(m)  - Bl (m)]  U'(m)dm =  o  (-.1)(.02e  )dm +  .0065
1
= +  .le-02m +  .0065
0
= +  .0045
Since  this final value of  the objective function is  positive,
Theorem  3,  implies  that  a1 is  preferred  to  a4 by  all decision
makers  whose  absolute  risk  aversion  functions  lie  between  r1 = .01  and
r2 = .02.  The  utility function, U (m), which minimizes  the objective
function has an absolute risk  aversion function given by
.02 when m < 3
r (m)  .01 when 3 < m < 6
.02 when m > 6
Note that this  utility function does not have constant absolute  aver-
sion even  though the bounds  on  the absolute risk aversion functions  were
specified as  constants.  This  is because  the control problem is a "bang-bang"
one where  the  control variable  switches between  the upper and lower bounds
as  the value of  the  objective function changes sign in the  integration proce-
dure.  Consequently,  the  utility function which minimizes  the objective  function-47-
is  discontinuous at  those monetary outcomes where  the control variable switches
values.  This  utility function ensures  the  preference ordering  between two
risky prospects holds  for  all decision makers within the  defined  interval
because it  minimizes  the  difference  in the  expected utility between the
two  given distributions.  All other decision makers  in  that same  interval
must have,  therefore, a greater difference  in  the  expected utility between
the  two  distributions and  the  same preference ordering.
Empirical Applications of  the  Generalized Stochastic  Dominance Approach
Empirical applications of  the generalized stochastic dominance  approach
to  date have been few, primarily because of  the  recent development of  the
theory.  The  first study to  use this  procedure  in an empirical analysis
was Meyer  (1977c).  In this  study, Meyer  used stochastic dominance with
respect  to  a function as  an evaluative criterion to determine whether mutual
funds were inferior investments  to  the Dow Jones  Industrial Average  (DJIA)
for different groups of investors  defined by  their minimum and maximum
measure of  risk aversion.  Meyer wrote a computer program that  compares  the
cumulative distributions  of  the rate  of  return  for  alternative  investment
strategies  for  any given rl(m) and r2(m).  In the computation procedure,  the
interval bounds were chosen to  be constant over  the entire domain of  monetary
outcomes;  however, the  results obtained when rl(m) and r2(m) were specified
as increasing  or decreasing  functions were reportedly not substantially
different..  The results of  the  study indicated that  for  certain groups of
decision makers  (which may or  may not  include most  investors as  defined  by
their  risk aversion  interval),  the majority or mutual funds  were  inferior
investments  to  the  DJIA for  the years  1954-1963.
King  (1979) used and extended Meyer's procedure to agricultural decision
analysis  under uncertainty in his Ph.D. dissertation.  In this  study, King-48-
developed a set  of integrated  techniques  designed  for  use in applied decision
analysis  based on expected utility.  These  techniques include:  problem
formulation, the determination  of  subjective probability distributions,  the
measurement of  decision maker preferences, and  the  identification  of  preferred
choices.
With regard to  the measurement of  decision maker preferences, King
discussed the shortcomings of  both single-valued utility  functions and  first
and second  degree SD as efficiency criteria in applied  research.  He  then
presented Meyer's  interval approach as a viable alternative  to  measure  decision
maker preferences.  He explained how this  procedure allows  the  direct
specification of  any degree of  precision with which preferences  are measured,
since the absolute risk aversion  interval  can be of  any  desired width.  The
elicitation procedures and construction of  interval measurements based  on
Meyer's criterion were then developed.  The procedure  to  measure decision
maker preferences was  used in conjunction with generalized  stochastic  dominance
as an evaluative criterion to  order alternative choices.  This  evaluative tool
was  integrated with his  formulation of  a generalized
-risk efficient Monte
Carlo programming  (GREMP) model  to  identify preferred  choices.  This model
was applied to  the  analysis of  two  related agricultural problems.  The first
problem was concerned with land rental and crop  production decisions on a
small grain farm under conditions  of  uncertainty with respect  to  prices,
yields,  and time available  for fieldwork.  The  second  considered  these  same
decisions in conjunction with the selection of  a flexible marketing strategy
which evaluated forward contracting  strategies  over a seven month period.
In  conjunction with King's  (1979) research, Robison and King  (1978) and
King and Robison  (1981a, b) have  developed a series  of  shorter studies  on  the
theory and  empirical applications  of  generalized SD.  The  last  two publications,-49-
King  and  Robison  (1981a, b),  summarized the  previous work on stochastic dom-
inance with respect  to  a function and outlined the  operational procedures  for
implementing the interval approach in an applied context.  These procedures
include  the  specification  of  a measurement  scale  (i.e.,  a set of  reference
levels of  absolute  risk aversion which serve as  the basis  for preference),  the
generation of  sample distributions and  the identification of  a boundary interval
for each pair of  distributions,  the construction and administration ot  tte
questionnaire, and  the  use of  interval preference measurements  to  order  alter-
native choices.  The appendix to  King and Robison  (1981a) contains:  (i)  a
sample questionnaire designed  to  make direct  interval preference measurements
at different  levels  of incomes,  and  (ii)  the FORTRAN programs  used to  generate
the  sample distributions which serve as  the basis  for  the  choices used  to
reveal the  decision maker's preference  and to  identify  the boundary intervals
(INTID) and  to order  the  action choices  according  to  the  rules  of Meyer's
criterion  (SDRF).
Kramer and Pope  (1981)  h:ave  used  the generalized  SD approach  to
analyze  the decision of  farmers  to  participate in  farm commodity  programs.
Meyer's  interval procedure was  used in  this  study as  an evaluative criterion
to  compare  the  entire probability distributions  of  expected net  returns of
participation and nonparticipation for  different sets  of  decision makers assuming
the  basic program features  of  the Food and Agricultural Act  of  1977.  This
study  then showed how changes  in  particular program parameters and farm  size
can  affect program participation decisions,  given varying attitudes  toward
risk;  e.g.,  increasing  the  loan rate, ceteris paribus,  suggested  fewer  program
participants.  The participation decision was  analyzed by computing probability
distributions  of  net returns for  a representative California field crop  farm.
The probability distributions were based  on average prices and yields  (assumed-50-
to be  independent)  for  1969-1978,  synthesized  cost  data,  the  1979  target
prices,  loan rates,  and set-asides, and a variable program allocation factor.
Mever's  computer program was used  to  rank  the participation and  the nonpartici-
pation distributions  for each of  the  policy alternatives  and for  two different
farm situations  (change  in crop mix and farm scale).  The results of  this
procedure determined whether participation in the  program dominated non-
participation for each of  the policy alternatives  for different sets  of
decision makers  defined by  their absolute risk aversion interval.  This
approach was  shown  to  have  a decided advantage over  the more restrictive
E-V  analysis, particularly since the  returns both  in and out  of  the program
were not normally distributed  (or symmetric).
The results of  the above  studies which use the  generalized stochastic
dominance approach indicate  that  this  technique appears  to  be very promising
when used  as  an evaluative criterion.  Because of  its  greater  flexibility
and discriminating power, stochastic  dominance with respect  to  a function
should provide a very useful method for analyzing  the  impacts  of  policy changes
on program choice and for aiding in decision making at  the micro  level.  In
addition, the  research of King and Robison on using  the interval approach
to  elicit and measure decision maker  preferences may  provide a viable
alternative to  the single-valued utility elicitation methods.-51-
V.  SUMMARY
Bernoullian utility analysis provides  the  theoretical basis
for ranking risky  prospects with expected utility analysis, mean-variance
analysis  and stochastic dominance approaches.  This paper contrasts
ordinary and generalized stochastic dominance  approaches with  the other
methods  of  specifying an efficient choice.
Each  of  the approaches  requires knowledge  of  the  (discrete or
continuous) probability distribution  of  consequences  for each of  the decision
maker's actionsbeing considered.  Selection of  the action maximizing
expected utility  in a direct manner requires knowledge  of  the  decision
maker's  utility  function.  While significant progress has been made in
estimating such  functions, many  conceptual and empirical problems remain
to be resolved before estimated functions  can be used either to make
normative recommendations  to  individual producers or  to  predict how producers
will respond  to changes  in  technology, new institutional arrangements.  and
alternative price relationships.
Given the  inability to readily estimate  the utility  functions of
individual decision makers, E-V and  stochastic dominance  criteria have
been proposed  as means of  identifying  sets  of efficient actions  for all
decision makers having utility  functions with certain specified properties.
Decision makers  whose preferences belong  to  the defined  class  of  utility
functions will  find their utility maximizing  alternative in  the efficient
set.  This  efficient  set may contain more  than one risky prospect, requiring
decision makers to  compare  the alternatives  and select  the preferred action.
Nevertheless,  the  approach is  attractive in  that it  reduces  the number of
alternatives a decision maker must consider  in making a choice.-52-
First degree  stochastic dominance  requires little  information
concerning  the utility function.  It  simply  requires that  the  individual
prefer more  to  less  (that is  U (m)  > 0).  The  application of FSD  is  easy
computationally, but empirical studies  indicate  it  is  of  limited use in
reducing the size  of  the  efficient set.
Second  degree stochastic dominance requires  that  the  first  deriva-
tive of  the utility function is positive and  the  second derivative is
negative  - that  the individual is  risk averse.  While  the  computational
procedure is  somewhat more  complex  than for FSD, empirical studies  indicate
SSD  is  more effective  in reducing  the  size  of  the efficient  set.  It is
important  to note  that while  the E-V criteria is  computationally  less
difficult  to apply than SSD,  using  the expected value and variance result
in  the same efficient set only  if  the  consequences are  approximately normally
distributed.  Comparisons of risky  prospects using  the E-V rule break down
when the distributions are not normal.  The stochastic dominance rules
are applicable regardless  of  the form of  the  distributions.
In addition to positive and diminishing marginal utility, third
degree stochastic dominance requires  that the  third derivative of  the  under-
lying utility function  is positive.  This assumption  is  a necessary but
not a sufficient condition  for decreasing absolute risk aversion.  Third
degree stochastic dominance may  reduce the  efficient  set when the  probabil-
ity  distributions are highly skewed.
Generalized stochastic dominance permits  selecting  the efficient
set of  actions  for decision makers having an absolute risk aversion function
between a lower  and upper bound rl(m) and r2(m) over  a specified domain of
monetary outcomes.  The flexibility to  specify rl(m) and r2(m) at any level-53-
within the range from -~ to +o,  makes  this  a very powerful method of
selecting  an efficient  set, although computationally  it  is  the most difficult.
There  appear to be many opportunities  to  apply generalized  sto-
chastic dominance to make recommendations  for  decision makers  and to
evaluate how.  decision makers will respond  to  changes in price, technology,
and institutions.  Furthermore,  the  availability of  this procedure reduces
the need  to estimate  single valued utility functions for  individual decision
makers.  However, applications of  stochastic dominance procedures provide
increased  incentive  to  carefully estimate the probability distribution,
rather  than arbitrarily assuming a convenient form.  Generalized stochastic
dominance also emphasizes  the need to  estimate decision makers'  absolute
risk aversion  functions  to  exploit  this technique  in both normative and
positive applications.  Perhaps  the procedures  outlined by King and Robison
(1981b) can be used  to develop  these data.-54-
APPENDIX
The  purpose  of  this  appendix  is  to  concisely  state  and  prove  the
stochastic dominance  theorems for  continuous random variables--theorems
which  are  related  to  but  not  specifically  detailed  in  the  textual
presentation  of  this  paper.  Before  proceeding  with  this  task,  it  is
useful  to  define some  additional terms which simplify both the  theorems
and  the  proofs.  Accordingly, define  the following:
1 is  the set  of  all utility functions  that are  continuous and have
continuous,  strictly positive  first derivatives in  lmIm;
2 is  the set  of  those $1 utility  functions that also  have continuous,
negative second derivatives  in  mlmI1;
3 is  the set  of those  02 utility functions  that also have continuous,
strictly positive  third derivatives  in  Vl 1 ,mI;
E U(m)F  is  the expected utility  of money  associated with distribution
F (m);
E U(m)G is  the expected utility  of money associated with distribution
Gl(m);
U(n)(m) =  dnU(m)/dmn;
m




G (m)  =  f  G  ,(y)dy,  (n  >  1);  and
n  n-  1 ml
H  (m)  =  Gl (m)  - F l (m);
so  that
H  (m)  =  f H  (y)dy  =  Gn(m)  - Fn(m),  (n  >  1),  where  y  is  the  variable  of
Hn (  =  Hn-1  n  '(y)dy
mi
integration.-55-
Since the  following result  is  useful later,  it  is asserted here and proven
in a footnote.
(A-i)  dH  (m)  =  H  (m)dm, (n > 1)  A/
n  n-'
FSD Theorem:  If  (a.)F l(m)  Gl(m)  for  all me  l,mi] with the strict
inequality holding  for at  least one m and  (b.)UeUl,  then
E  U(m)]F >  E U(m)]G.
SSD Theorem:  If  (a.)F 2(m) <  G2 (m) for all me  m1,mI  with the strict
inequality holding for  at  least one m and  (b.)Ue£2,  then
E  E(m)F > E U(m)] G .
TSD Theorem:  If  (a.)F 3 (m) < G3 (m) for all m£smlm  I  with  the  strict inequality
holding for at least one m,  (b.)F 2 (m I)  < G2 (mI),  and  (c.)Us 3,  then
E U(m)]F >  E U(m)]G.
One approach that may be taken  to prove  these  theorems is that  of
showing  that  certain conditions,  e.g.,  conditions  (a.)  and  (b.)  in the
FSD  theorem,  imply  that  the  expected  utility  of  act  a.  associated  with
. .
the CDF Fl(m) is  greater  than the  expected utility associated with a.
having CDF Gl(m).  An alternative approach is  to  develop  the  converse,
i.e.,  to develop expressions  for  the expected utilities associated with
each act and from these, reveal that  certain conditions insure  that one
alternative  is preferred to another.  The proofs contained  herein proceed
according  to  the  latter  approach.
Proof  of  FSD:  To  begin  with,  the  idea  that
y  be  wrin  >  E  (m)]i
may  be  written  in  the  following  form  while  inferring  the  same  meaning,  i.e.,
(A-2)  ElU(m)]  - EU(m)F  < O-56-
By definition,  the left hand side  (lhs)  of the  strict  inequality  (A-2)
may be written  as:
(A-3)  mI  m (A-3)  U(m)dGl )  U(m)(m)  - U(m)  (m)dH  (m).
1  1  ml
Writing  the rule  for integration by parts as
mI  m  m
f  udv =uv  - I vdu
m  1  m1
and letting u =  U(m),  dv =  dHl (m)  gives
m7  m)  m




(A-4')  E U(m)  - ELU(m)F =  U' (n)H(m)dm
where H  (ml)  =  G1(mI ) - F1(mI)  =  1 - 1 =  0 and Hl(m 1) =  G1 (m ) - F(m)  = 0 -0  =0
if  mI  is  the largest value and ml the  smallest value of either distribution.
From  (A-4')  it  is  clear that for  the expected utility of  act  aj  with
* .
CDF F (m)  to  be greater  than that of  act a.  with CDF Gl(m),
mI
- f  U'(m)Hl(m)dm < O.  One way in which this  strict  inequality holds  is
mi
if  conditions  (a.)  and  (b.) of  the FSD theorem persist, i.e.,  if
Hl(m)  =  Gl(m)  - F l (m) > 0 for  all me  l,mli  with the strict  inequality
holding  for at  least one m and U'(m) > 0.  In words, suppose an individual
prefers more income  (and/or wealth)  to  less  and seeks  to maximize  the
expected utility of  income in a risky world.  If  the probability of
getting m or less  dollars  is at  least  as  great or  greater with one action
(aj  )  thanwithanother action  (aj)  regardless of  the level of  income,
I  '  2A/
the individual will prefer a.  to  a  . --  However, conditions  (a.)  and
(b.)  in  the FSD theorem are  not the only ones which may satisfy  (A-4')
such  that E J(m)]F > E U(m)]G.-57-
Proof  of  SSD:  To  demonstrate  this,  merely  perform  integration  by  parts
on  the  right  hand  side  (rhs)  of  (A-4')  by  letting  u  =  U'(m) and
dv  =  HI ( m) dm  F-dH2 (m)  by  (A-1) . This  step  yields
m I mI mI
(A-5)  -f  U'  (m)H (m)dm  =  -U'  (m)H2(m)  I  +  I  H2 (m)U''(m)dm
m  1  m1
which  in  turn  suggests
m (
(A-5')  Eu(m)G  - EU(m)OF  -U(mI)H 2(m I )  +  f U'(m)H 2 (m)dm
m1
where  H2 (ml)  =  0 from  footnote  1A.
By  applying  conditions  (a.)  and  (b.)  of  the  SSD  Theorem  to  (A-5'),
it  is  possible  to  show  that  there  is  another way  for  both  sides  of  (A-4')
to  be  negative  besides  those  discussed  in  the  FSD  case.  In  so  doing,
it  becomes  clear  that  by  relaxing  the  condition  on  the  cumulative  distribu-
tion  functions,  a  stricter  condition  must  be  imposed  upon  the  utility
function  in  order  to  rank  one  alternative  action  over  another.  From  SSD
condition  (b.),  UE 2 implies  U'  >  0 and  U"  <  0.  Moreover,  SSD  condition
2  m
(a.)  suggests  that  even  if  G2 (mI )  - F2 (mI )  =  H 2(mI)  =  0, f  U'(m)H 2 (m)dm  <  0
ml
since  H2 (m)  >  0 for  at  least  one  m in  the  closed  interval  mli,mI.  Hence,
!  t!t
the  expected  utility  of  act  a.  is  greater  than  that  of  act  a.  if  an
individual  prefers  more  income  to  less,  is  risk  averse,  and  the  cumulative
area  under  the  CDF  F1 (m)  is  less  than  or  equal  to  the  cumulative  area
under CDF Gl(m)  for all me  1,mif,  i.e.,  F2 (m)E  - Fl(y)dy  <  G1(y)dy  G2 (m)
m1 m
with  the strict inequality holding for at  least one m.
Second degree  stochastic dominance is more easily  understood, perhaps,
if  one turns  to  the  discrete random variable example  in the  text and  the
corresponding probabilities  in  Table  2.  Recall that by SSD, it  is
said  that act  a1 is  dominant  to  a3 . For  the ease  of  the ensuing discussion,
the relationship  between the various probabilities  of  the  distributions
Ql(m) and Bl(m) may be reproduced in the  following manner where a = 0.2  and  6  =  0.2.-58-
Table  Al.  Probabilities  associated  with  the  distributions  Q1  and  B1, a  >  0.
qs_  . b  Q  -B1  Q2 - B
q  (0)  b  (0) =  q  (0)  0  0
q  (1)  b  (1)  =  q  (1)  0  0
q  (2)  b  (2)= q  (2)  - a  a
q  (3)  b  (3)  =  q  (3)  +  a  0
q  (4)  b  (4)  q  (4)  0
q  (5)  b  (5)  =  q  (5)  0
q  (6)  b  (6)  =  q  (6)  +  -3  c-S
q  (7)  b  (7)=  q  (7)  - 8  0  a-S
q  (8)  b  (8)  q  (8)  0  a-S
q  (9)  b  (9)= q  (9)  0  a-6
q(10)  b(10)  =  q(10)  0  c-B
From  this,  it  is  easily  shown  that:
(A-6)  EU((m)]B  - ELU(m)]i  =  aU(3)  U  - U(2  - (7)  - U(6)].
Forget  for  the  moment  that  it  is  known  that a =  =  0.2 but  assume
a  >  0.  Now,  Q1 (6)  - B1 (6)  =  -S  suggests  that  because  3  >  0, K1 and  F1
cannot  be  ranked  according  to  the  FSD  Theorem  without  violating  condition
(a.)  of  that  theorem.  If  6  >  a,  it  would  be  necessary  to  know  the  magnitude
of  U(3)  - U(2)  relative  to  U(7)  - U(6)  and  hence  the  specification  of  the
utility  function  before  ranking  Q1 and  F1; but,  a  basic  reason  for  using
stochastic  dominance  is  to  be  able  to  rank  distributions  when  the  specifi-
cation  of  the  utility function  is  unknown.  However,  certain  knowledge
about  the  utility  function,  for  instance,  that  more  is  preferred  to  less
and  that  marginal  utility  diminishes  (condition  (b.)  of  the  SSD  Theorem),
suggests  that  U(3)  - U(2)  >  U(7)  - U(6)  >  0.  This  information  combined
with  the  fact  that  B is  strictly  positive  enables  one  to  conclude  that
EE(m)]B - EU(m)]Q > 0 if and only if a  > B.  The requirement that a  > S
when a, 3 >  0 is  equivalent  to  condition  (b.)  of the  SSD Theorem, i.e.,-59-
Q2(m)  - B2(m)  > 0 for  all  m with  the  strict  inequality  holding  for  at  least
one  m  (see  column  4,  Table  1A).  In  summary,  if  it  is  known  that  U'(m)  >  0
and  U"'(m)  < 0,  then  the  difference  in  the  utilities  of outcomes  of  $3
and  $2,  i.e.,  U(3)  - U(2),  is  greater  than  U(7)  - U(6).  Given  this,  the
higher  probability  of  an  outcome  of  $3  associated  with  act  al  relative
to  a  contributes  more  to  expected  utility  than  does  the  higher  probability
of  an  outcome  of $7  corresponding  to  act  a3  relative  to  a1 .
Proof  of  TSD:  Just  as  FSD  fails  to  rank  all  acts,  so  too  does  SSD.  Another  way
of  ranking  risky  alternatives  according  to  expected  utility maximization  in
the  stochastic  dominance  format  requires  additional  knowledge  (and/or
an  assumption)  about  the  utility  function,  i.e.,  U'  (m)  >  0.  Given  this,
however,  condition  (b.)  of  the  SSD  Theorem  may  be  relaxed  to  arrive  at
the  conditions  of  the  TSD  Theorem.  The  relaxation  of  the  condition  on
the  distributions  expands  the  set  of  distributions  which  may  be  ranked
relative  to  one  another.  To  demonstrate,  integrate  by  parts  the  second
term  on  the  rhs  of  (A-5')  by  setting  u  =  U"(m) and  dv  =  H2 (m)dm  pdH 3(m)]
which  gives:
mI m I mI
(A-7)  I  U''(m)H2(m)dm =  U''(m)H 3(m)  - I  H  (m)  ''(m)dm
m  m1  m
mI
(A-7')  =  U''(mI)H3(mI )  - Il  ' '(m)H3(m)dm
m 1
where,  as  before,  H3 (m1)  =  0.  Substitution  of  (A-7')  into  (A-5')  suggests
FE(A-8)  - ErU (m)  ]  E(  F =  -U'(mI)H 2(m I )  +  U(I)H3(m  )  - I  '  (m)H(m)dm.
ml
Imposition  of  the  conditions  in  the  TSD Theorem  insures  the  negativity
of  the  equality  above  and  reveals  the  dominance  of  a,  distribution  Fl(m)
over  a. with  distribution  G  (m)  for  decision  makers  whose  goal  is  to
1  1
maximize expected utility.-60-
Turn  again  to  the  data  in  Table  2  of  the  text.  With  this  information
in  mind,  it  is  suggested  that  Bl(m)  is  strictly  preferred  to  Zl (m)  by
the  TSD selection  rule  if  it  is  assumed  (or  known)  that  Uc  3 . To  show
this,  let y  = 0.05  and  express  the  probabilities  associated  with  the  two
distributions  in  the  following  way.
Table  A2.  Probabilities  associated  with  distributions  B1 and  Z1,  y  =  0.05.
z  b  .- B  Z-B  Z-B z  b  Z1  - B.  z2  B2  z3  -B 3
z  (0)  =  0.10  b  (0)  =  0.10  =  z  (0)  0  0  0
z  (1)  =  0.10  b  (1)  =  0.00  =  z  (1)  - 2y  2y  0  0
z  (2)  =  0.15  b  (2)  =  0.00  =  z  (2)  - 3y  5y  2y  Y
z  (3)  =  0.05  b  (3)  =  0.20  =  z  (3)  +  3y  2y  7y  5.5y
z  (4)  =  0.10  b  (4)  =  0.30  =  z  (4)  +  4y  -2y  9y  13.5y
z  (5)  =  0.00  b  (5)  =  0.00  =  z  (5)  -2y  7y  21.5y
z  (6)  =  0.00  b,  (6)  =  0.20  =  z  (6)  +  4y  -6y  5y  27.5y
z  (7)  =  0.20  b  (7)  =  0.00  =  z  (7)  - 4y  -2y  -y  29.5y
z  (8)  =  0.25  b  (8)  =  0.00  =  z  (8)  - 5y  3y  -3y  27.5y
z  (9)  =  0.05  b  (9)  =  0.20  =  z  (9)  +  3y  0  0  26.Oy
z(10)  =  0.00  b(10)  =  0.00  =  z(10)  0  0  26.0y
Clearly, columns 3 and 4 of Table A2  reveal  that Zl(m)  may not be
ranked relative  to B (m) with either FSD or SSD since some entries  in these
two  columns are negative.  Computing the  expected utilities  for  each distri-
bution and calculating  the difference reveals
(A-9)  E  U'm)B - ELU(m)]Z
- -2yU(l)  - 3yU(2)  + 3yU(3)  + 4yU(4)  + 4yU(6)  - 4yU(7)  - 5yU(8)  + 3yU(9)
Now,  note  that  U(9)  may  be written as
(A-10)  U(9)  =  U(9)  - U(8)]  +  EU(8)  - U(7)j  +  CU(7)  - U(6)]  +  LU(6)  - U(5)]
+  LU(5)  - U(4)]  +  [U(4)  - U(3)]  +  [U(3)  - U(2)]  +  [U(2)  - U(1)]  +  U(1).
Reexpressing  the  other  terms  in  (A-9)  in  a  similar  manner  allows  (A-9)  to  be
rewritten  as-61-
E  LU(m  B - ELU(m)iz
= 3yU(9)  - U(8)]  - 2yU(8)  - U(7)]  - 6YU(7)  - U(6)]  - 2yJU(6)  - U(5)]
- 2yrU(5)  - U(4)]  +  2yiU(4)  - U(3)]  +  5yU(3)  - U(2)]  +  2yEU(2)  - U(1)
(A-9')  =  3  :  EU(9)  - U(8)]  - :U(8)  - U(7)]}  - {  U(7)  - U(6)]  - ,'(6) - U(5)}I
+  yGsU(8)  - - U  (7  -(7)  - U(6)¶}  - {LU(6)  - U(5)]  -I(5)  - U(4)](
+  2y{[U(4)  - U(3)]  -U(7)  - U(6)]}
+  4Y{[U(3)  - U(2)]  -LU(6)  - U(5)]}
+  Y{[U(3)  - U(2)]  -LU(5)  - U(4)]}
+  2y{rU(2)  - U(l)  - ru(5)  - U(4)1}.
In  general,  if  the  specific  form  of  U(m)  is  unknown,  then  for  (A-9')
to  be  positive,  each  of  the  six  terms  in  (A-9')  must  be  positive.  Pursuing
this,  it  is  obvious  that  since  U'(m)  >  0, U(m i)  >  U(minl).  Moreover,
U''(m) <  0 implies  that  U(mi)  - U(mi ) >  U(M  )  - U(mi  ),  >  1,  so
i+l  i+k+l  i+2)
clearly, the  last  four  terms  are  positive.  Given  the  above  information,
however,  it  is  also  evident  that
(A-11)  {  U(mi+2)  - U(mi+)]  - u(mi+l)  - U(mi)]  <  0.
Therefore,  the  first  two  terms  in  (A-9')  are  positive  in  these  circumstances
only  if
(A-12)  |{  [(mi)  - U(mi_l)]  -U(mi- 1 )  - i(m_2)]}
> (mi+ 2 )  U(m-  U(mi+))  - U  (mi)]}
The  reader  can  verify  that  the  inequality  in  (A-12)  is  satisfied  if  U"'  '  m)  >  0
given  U'  ()  >  0  and  U  '(m)  <  0 which  thereby  confirms  the  necessity  of  the
condition  Ues3 in  the  TSD  Theorem.
The  previous  theorems,  proofs,  and  examples  of  discrete  distributions
reveal  that  stochastic  dominance  may  be  used  to  reduce  the  list  of  potential
actions  which  an  expected  utility  maximizing  decision  maker  may  be  considering-62-
without  knowledge  about  the  specification  of  the  decision  maker's  utility
function.  However,  it  has  also  been  revealed  that  a  loosening  of  the
restrictions  on  the  distributions  associated  with  various  acts,  in  turn,
requires  stricter  assumptions  about  the  signs  of  the  derivatives
of  the  utility  function.  To  show  the extent  to  which  this  is  true,  one
must merely consider the "selection rule"  for N  Degree Stochastic
Dominance  where equations  (A-4'),  (A-5'),  and  (A-8) are referred to  as  the
FSD, SSD, and TSD selection rules,  respectively.  Accordingly, the selection
rule for  Nth Degree Stochastic Dominance  is
(A-13)  EU(m)]F  - ELU(m)]G
N  mI
%  )n-l  (n-1  N  (N)
=  (-l)  U( n l ) (m)Hn(m)  + (-1)  f  U  (m)dHN+  (m)
where~  U))  =  anml
where  U(0) (m) =  U(m),  H(m.) =  0 and  dHN+l(m)  =  -N(m)dm  from  (A-l).-63-
1A/  To  see  this, note that  from the  definition of H (m) it  is obvious that
n
dH (m) =  dfl  H,-(Y)dY.
mi
For any  function k(x)+c =f  k'(x)dx, it  is  the case that dk(x) =  k'(x)dx =
dLrf  k'(x)dx]  and hence
-d (m)  =  H  (y)dy
n  n-i
mi 1
=  H  n(m)dm - Hn_l(m) dm  Hn-  (m)dm
where  substitution of mi  for m in  the definition of  H (m) yields
ml
H (m)  f  H  f(m)dm  (n  >  1)
n1  n-1
ml
which is equivalent to  zero by  the rules  of integration.
2A/  An alternative method of  asserting this "if,  then"  statement  is "if
the probabilities of obtaining m  or more dollars  is  at  least as  great
or  greater with one action  (a')  than with another  (a. )  regardless
of  the  level  of income,  the  individual will prefer  a.  to  a . "-64-
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